Creaming-Skimming, Parking and Other Intended and Unintended Effects of Performance-Based Contracting in Social Welfare Services
| dc.contributor.author | Koning, Pierre | |
| dc.contributor.author | Heinrich, Carolyn J. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-28T19:58:32Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-09-28T19:58:32Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-09 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The authors' analysis finds that government-contracted private providers of job placement services in the Netherlands tend to focus on helping clients who are the easiest to place, a practice known as cream-skimming, when the providers are engaged through fully performance-contingent contracts. In addition, making contract payments fully contingent on performance appears to increase job placements, but not job duration, for more readily employable workers. | en |
| dc.identifier.other | 2010-021 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/46472 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | La Follette School Working Papers | |
| dc.title | Creaming-Skimming, Parking and Other Intended and Unintended Effects of Performance-Based Contracting in Social Welfare Services | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |