Choose Your Weapon: International Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice
| dc.contributor.author | Copelovitch, Mark S. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Pevehouse, Jon C. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-09-09T17:57:19Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-09-09T17:57:19Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the question of whether governments engage in "exchange rate protection" - that is, whether they actively manipulate the exchange rate and/or utilize exchange rate fluctuations as a lever to influence the terms of trade. Using data on 21 countries from 1975-1999, the paper identifies specific conditions under which governments use exchange rate policy as a substitute for trade protection. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | 2007-038 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/36258 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | La Follette School Working Papers | en_US |
| dc.title | Choose Your Weapon: International Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice | en_US |
| dc.type | Working paper | en_US |
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