Robust Incentives and the Design of a Climate Change Governance Regime
| dc.contributor.author | Nemet, Gregory F. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-02-26T18:05:58Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-02-26T18:05:58Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-02 | |
| dc.description.abstract | A poorly coordinated international governance regime has the advantage of reducing the risk associated with a global policy failure. Beyond this case study, the importance of this positive effect depends on the probability of policy failures in each country, the correlations among them and the probability of a global policy failure. | en |
| dc.identifier.other | 2010-006 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/38822 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | La Follette School Working Papers | |
| dc.title | Robust Incentives and the Design of a Climate Change Governance Regime | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |